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a b s t r a c t
Individuals may have biased perceptions of health and safety risks. We conjecture
perceptions of mortality risk from various risk measures using parametric and non-
parametric methods. We investigate how risk perceptions are measured and what rational
explanations can be found for these measures with implication for risk and solvency.
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1. Introduction
Individualsmayhave biased perceptions of health and safety risks. This is the issue addressed bymany studies concerning
health and safety as well as mortality risk [1,2,11,15,17,18,21,23].
In our study we question if people err in their perceptions of mortality risk. If yes, is it because they behave irrationally
or they behave rationally but lack sufficient information when forming perceptions or rather, they have full information
and behave rationally but make mistakes because they are subject to bounded rationality? If no, what evidence is there to
verify bias in perceptions? The evidence proposed has tended to be in the form of regression analysis as in [1,2] where risk
perception is shown to be negatively skewed. A description of risk measures that are discussed in [3,4] include symmetric
and asymmetric measures of risk. In this paper we divide measures of risk into symmetric and asymmetric measures.
Measures of risk that are symmetric like variance or standard deviation are not the best measures of risk perception when
perceived risks are skewed. Asymmetric measures of risk are appropriate when there exists asymmetric perceptions as in
[9,10]. Following Fishburn [9,10] and Unser [27] we develop a model of lower partial moments as a measure of perceived
risk.
In order to show skewed risk perception, empirical studies look for any systematic errors in responses to survey questions
concerning hazards. Tests involve the significance of dispersion of perceived hazard rates from actual hazard rates. The
conclusion has tended to be either to accept or reject the common assertion that people’s estimates of hazards to life appear
to overstate low probability causes and to understate high probability causes. This conclusion is based on an underlying
symmetric distribution of risks.
In order to find out how information acquisition is significant, two groups of individuals are usually considered. A group
who has low cost in acquiring information or due to their careers/occupations finds information gathering economically
justified. A second group on the other hand is provided with some relevant information to anchor their responses in order
to reflect their perceptions. The maintained hypothesis in this regard is that people are well informed about the risks they
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face but may be uninformed about risks that the population faces. Thus in gathering information individuals are assumed
to look for the most relevant information and bear in mind the costs involved in acquiring this information. In this sense
individualsmay be assumed to behaving rationally.What underlies themaintained hypothesis are the individuals particular
circumstances like age, occupation and education. Perceptions aremore likely to be affected by information about one’s own
age, occupation or circumstances than population wide information. People anchor their perceptions also on limited and
costly information they have and can acquire.Whereas the correction of their perceived image about a hazard or a risk could
be adjusted slowly to new information as individuals get older, are educated further or change occupations.
If risk perception is affected by individual specific information instead of population wide information then, the nature
of skewness in risk perception may be defined.
In considering how rational individuals behave, attention is drawn to the point that information acquisition by individuals
about certain events is greater than their information gathering about uncertain events. This implies that rational agents’
information gathering is subject to bounded rationality and may be less than perfect. Therefore Bayesian learning is cost
constrained. This means our Bayesian updating is subject to costs and accordingly the conditional probabilities need to
include cost parameters.
If it is true that there is a bias in risk perceptions, then canwe conclude that people are irrational in forming perceptions?
This bias is, however, due to information asymmetry and decision-making subject to cost considerations. But based on a
Bayesian learning process, individuals may be quite rational. If rationality implies judgment with respect to symmetric risk
distributions, then people are irrational, but if we allow asymmetric risk distributions as in lower partial moments, then
people are not irrational. Does this mean that the results on perceptions of risk and mortality have been path dependent?
In this light we will consider regression techniques as well as Bayesian approaches to inference about public perception of
hazard and mortality risks.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our assumptions and propositions, Section 3 specifies our
model, Section 4 elaborates implications and applications of the model, Section 5 draws policy and solvency implications
and Section 6 concludes.
2. Overview
Public perceptions may be formed both by probabilities of risk and the magnitude of risks. Probabilities of risks and in
fact the crude rates in many instances are more accessible than any other risk measure. A number of risk measures have
been developed in the literature as in [28,29] that involve some measure of life lost in order to quantify the magnitude of
risks. Such measures of risks do in fact change the order of importance of risks to life but may not be so obvious intuitively.
In order to estimate perceptions of risks faced by individuals, it is necessary to find some quantitative measures of risks
faced by them. These measures could be estimates of the hazard rates for any of the ailments individuals are exposed to or
simply the current probability of hazard.
In what follows we make the following basic assumptions:
1. Individuals gather information efficiently. Costs of obtaining information imply individuals collect the most relevant
information concerning them and their cohort.
2. Individuals’ evaluation of information is rational.
We need to be clear here about what we mean by rationality of individuals. We
(a) define an objective function,
(b) allow asymmetric risk distributions,
(c) allow Bayesian learning with cost considerations,
(d) define decision-making with respect to the above.
Proposition 1. Risk perception is negatively skewed when perception is affected by individual specific information and is
positively skewed when affected by population wide information.
Proposition 2. Information acquisition is subject to event certainty.
3. Model parameterization
Using Bayesian framework the probability of a hazard is explained in terms of conditional probability of hazard given
exposure and the probability of exposure, i.e. P (D) = P (D|E) P (E) where probability of hazard is P (D), and P (D|E) is the
conditional probability with P (E) the probability of exposure. The probability of hazard given exposure is estimated by the
frequency of hazard j for individuals aged x,Djx divided by the total number of individuals aged x,Nx i.e. P (D|E) = Djx/Nx.
But as P (E) = Nx/N where N is total population, a tabular hazard rate can be estimated as the current probability of hazard
or P (D) = Djx/N . But P (D) calculated in this way does not take into account individual specific characteristics and only
considers frequencies of hazards. Crude rates do not show clearly hazards to life as individual characteristics like age are
ignored. For simplicity we now only consider age as a defining factor between different individuals.
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The conditional probability, i.e. the probability of hazard j given individual was exposed aged x, is ρjx = Djx/Dx where Dx
is the total number of individuals aged x exposed to hazard j. Whereas, the probability of hazard for an individual aged x,
given the individual was exposed to hazard j is λjx = Djx/Djin which Dj is the total number of individuals who are subject
to hazard jwhere
pj =
∑
ρjx = EYLLj/LLEj. (1)
Life Lost Expectancy (LLE) and Expected Years of Life Lost (EYLL) are twomeasures of risk that show how various hazards
to life are ranked according to each degree of risk. Based on LLE and EYLL that are part of non-parametric tools in this
literature, we can calculate a relative measure of risk in order to estimate perceptions of mortality. This means finding a
relative number of lives saved based on the mortality measure for particular conditions. For example taking auto accidents
as a reference point, i.e. anchoring the information given to individuals in their assessment of hazards, the LLE and EYLL for
all causesmay be comparedwith the corresponding LLE and EYLL for auto accidents in order to provide ameasure of relative
risk and hence perception.
Note, in forming perceptions, public knowledge of illnesses is significant. What is a particular version of neoplasm to the
medical profession is just cancer to the ordinary public, as discussed in [16,17,20,26]. Perceptions of health risks thus are
labeled as one or the other of some well-known ailments. These public labels i.e. the ‘‘labeling effect’’ may not exceed more
than a few names about which perceptions are formed.
Viscusi [29] shows how public perception may be affected by mortality measures. Death perception as measured by the
number of fatalities is regressed on total number of deaths as well as life lost expectancy and expected years of life lost
variables. The variable representing public perception, in the absence of a survey to provide direct estimates of perception,
is the actual fatality data for an ailment. This variable is assumed to represent a proxy variable for perception. This proxy
variable is then regressed on the total number of deaths as well as a combination of life lost expectancy and expected years
of life lost variables.
The inclusion of the product of life lost expectancy and total deaths, and total deaths as independent regressors, appear to
improve the explaining power of regression. But what is worth noting is not the improved adjusted coefficient of correlation
but change in the sign of total death regressors.While for an additional 22 total deaths, perception increases by one, formore
deaths, public perception falls. Hence the more death there is, the less public perceives it for any condition.
However, perceptions are formed by a learning process, through the probability of exposure to a hazard that can be
written as
P (E) = P(D)
P(D|E) . (2)
On the other hand there are risks that take time to cause a fatality, i.e. there is duration between exposure anddeath. Duration
related risks are those risks that take effect in time, thus are lagged for a period e.g. a number of years and thought to explain
public perception of mortality as in [29]. Some illnesses last for a period during which an individual is facing a health risk.
For example, most cancer ailments affect individuals for many years. While other conditions, for example motor accidents
resulting death take effect immediately. However, it is possible to take note of factors that vary across individuals in a hazard
function. The proportional hazard function introduced in [6] takes into account variations of hazards across individuals. This
model has been studied further in [8,12,22]. The probability that a death hazard takes place when an individual is aged t ,
i.e. during time t and t+∆t , can be decomposed into a heterogeneity factor, a duration probability, i.e. time dependence and
a function of observed covariates. These covariates may include individual specific characteristics and costs of information
acquisition. The hazard rate is then written as
h (t, x, β, γ ) = φ (x, β) p (t) γ (3)
where γ is a scalar parameter, representing individual specific characteristics that may be unobservable i.e. heterogeneity
factor. p (t) denotes the probability of hazard depending on time and φ (x, β) represents factors that depend on time
invariant exogenous observed cofactors x and parameters β . The specification in (3) introduces a functional decomposition
that describes hazard rates for time invariant hazards and duration dependency. For risks that take effect in time this
specification includes dummy variables (indicator functions) to incorporate time invariance and duration dependence
simultaneously. Decomposition of the hazard function using the proportional hazard technique is also applied in
multivariate survival analysis as in [5].
The hazard rate is typically written as:
h (t) = f (t)
1− F (t) (4)
where F (t) = ∫ t0 f (t) dt represents the probability distribution of hazard with density function f (t) defined over time t
and S (t) = 1 − F (t) is survival function. The shape of the hazard function in (4) depends on the particular probability
distribution F (t) that best describes the hazard probability from the data. A number of probability distributions may be
used. In particular constant hazard h (t) = h, exponential function and log logistic have been used in the literature. The
choice of these distributions depends usually on the goodness-of-fit criteria.
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If F (t) = λtp1+λtp then we can write (4) in log-logistic form as
h (t) = λpt
p−1
1+ λtp (5)
where p and λ are parameters representing duration dependence and time invariance, accordingly. As t ≥ 0 and λ > 0,
whenever 0 < p ≤ 1 the hazard function in (5) exhibits a negative time dependence (decreasing hazard) and for p > 1 it
has a positive time dependence (increasing hazard) which can be established by showing ddt h (t) < 0. > 0, respectively. In
particular we are interested in using this functional form to show skewness of perception depending on information about
risks. The parameter p is also known as the shape parameter. This parametric hazard function allows us to model increasing
and decreasing hazards that are typical of mortality experiences of people with hazard falling and then rising with age or
other characteristics.
This method of estimation has also been adopted in finance literature as in [7,30]. However, a rigorous treatment
of general hazard functions, identifiability and existence of a non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator is given in
[12,13]. The hazard function in (5) is parametric and thus continuous as opposed to non-parametric hazard functions that
are discrete. It is possible then, to include covariates, i.e. independent regressors thatmeasure or explain characteristics that
may vary across individuals but are fixed, at least for a period for every individual. These covariates could be characteristics
such as life-style, gender, location, etc. where theymay be used in the form of dummy variables when considering risks that
take effect in time.
We can expresses φ (x, β) in (3) as a function of covariates, i.e.
φ (x, β) = e−βxi for i = 1, . . . ,M (6)
where xi are dummy variables representing covariates, M is the number of individuals and β is survival time parameter.
Eq. (6) can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method. For the log-logistic function we could write (6) as
L =
M∏
i=1
[f (ti|p, β)]δi [S(ti|p, β)]1−δi (7)
where δi = 0 if an individual survives and 1 otherwise. Now substituting for f (t) = h (t) S (t) in (7) and taking logs and
then maximizing the log likelihood, we get
ln L =
M∑
i=1
ln h ( ti| p, β)+
M∑
i=1
ln S ( ti| p, β) where i ≤ M. (8)
As all individuals die eventually, the likelihood function may be written as
L =
M∏
i=1
[ϕf ( ti| p, β)]δi [(1− ϕ)+ ϕS ( ti| p, β)]1−δi (9)
where ϕ represents the probability that individuals eventually die, with 0 < ϕ ≤ 1. Eq. (9) is a generalization of the
likelihood function. But when considering perception as a function of implicit rate of time preference, we may not be able
to estimate the implicit rate of time preference for individuals directly. However this rate can be measured as the marginal
rate of substitution of health, now as opposed to in the future. This issue has been encountered in [24] suggesting people
may trade off quantity of life for quality of life. The marginal rate of substitution then offers a way to estimate a rate of
discount between quality of life versus quantity of life. In order to discount lives lost, the marginal rate of substitution can
be taken as a proxy for this rate of discount. It is estimated in [29] that a 3.3%–12.4% rate of discount shows a best fit in
regression analysis. But the alternative rate of time preference that is derived from the marginal rate of substitution shows
this rate may be variable throughout the lifetime of individuals. In order to estimate a rate of discount, this variable is added
to regressions in [29]. Thus by fitting various percentages the best fitted value is obtained. The criteria chosen in [29] for
best finding a rate of discount is the residual sum of squares, the standard error of the parameters and R¯2.
4. Discussion and applications
In regressionmodels ofmortality in contrast with the hazard ratemodels that dominate the demographic and population
economics literature as in [22,31] regression techniques are used for a number ofmortality riskmeasures. In these regression
models, covariates include a number of explanatory variables in order to estimate infant and child mortality. Here we see
factors affecting health include education, earnings, job satisfaction, gender, smoking, weight, hypertension, cholesterol
level, nutrition, occupation, labour force participation (i.e. retirement, disability, unemployment and death) and marital
status. These socio-economic factors are used to explain risks faced at an individual level.
In life cycle models of consumption as in [19] which adopt a hazard rate technique (the occurrence and timing of an
uncertain event) a rate of discount is estimated in an economic context in which demand for children is considered. While
in [14], the life cycle model of consumption is augmented to take into account the effects of mortality and bequests.
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The extent of symmetric measures of risk that typically use regression techniques, a priori depend on the absence
of interdisciplinary studies to indicate any skewness. In particular advances in experimental psychology have helped us
investigate alternative asymmetric risk measures. Nevertheless the choice of modeling techniques still remains on the
evidence of symmetry or otherwise of issues concerned.
5. Policy and solvency implications
Solvency II and the Basil recommendations have by now made far reaching changes and implications in financial
industry. However, there seems to be a need for similar regulatory considerations for risk classification and the effect
of population-wide information on risk perception. The perceived images of various risks have important bearings on
budgetary considerations for all concerned. Thus as Thomas [25] argues there is a need for a regulatory framework to
encompass risk categories and thus risk classification. Under Pillar III (market discipline) disclosure principles ensuremarket
participants have access to information to assess risks concerned. But there is no distinction between individual level
and population-wide information acquisition. The effects of these have not yet been proven for regulators. As we have
stated above there is widespread agreement on skewness of perceptions with underestimation of high probability risks and
overestimation of low probability risks. Thus there seems to be a need for a reassessment of financial risks as perceived
through individual biases and adaptation in regulatory instruments.
6. Conclusion
We have tried to highlight problems associated with measuring and estimating perceptions of an uncertain event: Life.
While it is no uncertainty that all lives will end, the timing is uncertain. Perceptions regarding this uncertainty are affected
by a number of factors in particular age, occupation, education and other individual specific characteristics. Methods used
in estimating perceptions are by no means definite. However there appears to be a substantial number of issues yet to be
resolved concerning biased perceptions and the way they affect individual decision-making.
Acknowledgements
Comments and suggestions of editors and anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of this
paper was presented at the RMS 2007 and ASTIN 2007 and participants’ comments are gratefully acknowledged.
References
[1] D.K. Benjamin,W.R. Dogan, Individuals estimates of the risks of death: Part I- A reassessment of the previous evidence, J. Risk Unc. 15 (1997) 115–133.
[2] D.K. Benjamin, W.R. Dogan, D. Buschena, Individuals’ estimates of the risk of death: Part II- new evidence, J. Risk Unc. 22 (1) (2001) 35–57.
[3] H.W. Brachinger, Measurement of risk, in: U. Derigs (Ed.), Optimization and Operations Research, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, EOLSS
Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2003, pp. 1119–1137.
[4] H.W. Brachinger, M. Weber, Risk as a primitive: A survey of measures of perceived risk, Op. Re. Spec. 19 (S3) (1997) 235–250.
[5] M.-H. Chen, J.G. Ibrahim, D. Sinha, Bayesian inference for multivariate survival data with a cure fraction, J. Mult. An. 80 (2002) 101–126.
[6] D.R. Cox, Regression models and life tables, JRSS (B) 34 (2) (1972) 187–200.
[7] R. DeYoung, Birth, growth and life or death of newly charted banks, Econ. Per. FRBC (3rd Q) (1999) 18–35.
[8] C. Elbers, G. Ridder, True and spurious duration dependence: The identifiability of the proportional hazard model, Rev. Econ. St. 49 (1982) 403–411.
[9] P.C. Fishburn, Foundations of risk measurement, effects of gains on risk, J. Math. Psy. 25 (1982) 226–242.
[10] P.C. Fishburn, Foundations of risk measurement, risk as a probable loss, Man. Sc. 30 (1984) 396–406.
[11] J.K. Hakes, W.K. Viscusi, Mortality risk perceptions: A bayesian reassessment, J. Risk Unc. 15 (1997) 135–150.
[12] J. Heckman, B. Singer, The identifiability of the proportional hazard model, Rev. Econ. St. 51 (1984) 231–241.
[13] J. Heckman, B. Singer, A method for minimizing the impact of distributional assumptions in econometric models for duration data, Econometrica 52
(2) (1984) 271–320.
[14] M.D. Hurd, Mortality risk and bequests, Econometrica 57 (4) (1989) 779–813.
[15] M.W. Jones-Lee, The Economics of Safety and Physical Risk, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989.
[16] M. Kusch, Towards a political philisophy of risk, in: T. Lowens (Ed.), Risk, Philosophical Perspectives, Routledge, 2007, pp. 131–155.
[17] S. Lichtenstein, P. Slovic, B. Fischhoff, M. Layman, B. Combs, Judged frequency of events, J. Hu. Psy.: Hu. Lear. Mem. 4 (6) (1978) 551–578.
[18] R.D. Luce, E.U. Weber, An axiomatic theory of conjoint expected risk, J. Math. Psy. 30 (1986) 188–215.
[19] J.L. Newman, C.E. McCulloch, A hazard rate approach to the timing of birth, Econometrica 52 (4) (1984) 939–962.
[20] G. Rowe, G. Wright, Differences in expert and lay judgments of risk: Myth or reality? Risk An. 21 (2) (2001) 341–356.
[21] R.K. Sarin, Some extensions of Luce’s measures of risk, Theo. Dec. 22 (1987) 125–141.
[22] R.C. Sickles, P. Taubman, Mortality and morbidity among adults and the elderly, in: M.R. Rosenzweig, O. Stark (Eds.), Handbook of Population and
Family Economics, North Holland, 1997, pp. 559–627.
[23] M. Siegrist, G. Cvetkovich, Perception of hazards: The role of social trust and knowledge, Risk An. 20 (5) (2000) 713–719.
[24] C.R. Sunstein, Bad deaths, J. Risk Unc. 14 (1997) 259–282.
[25] G.R. Thomas, Some novel perspectives on risk classification, Gen. Pap. 32 (2007) 105–132.
[26] A. Traversky, D. Kahneman, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, Science 185 (1974) 1124–1131.
[27] M. Unser, Lower partial moments as measures of perceived risk: An experimental study, WP, University of Bamberg, 1998.
[28] W.K. Viscusi, The value of risks of life and health, J. Econ. Lit. 31 (4) (1993) 1912–1946.
[29] W.K. Viscusi, J.K. Hakes, A. Carlin, Measures of mortality risks, J. Risk Unc. 14 (1997) 213–233.
[30] G. Whalen, A proportional hazard model of bank failure: An examination of its usefulness as an early warning tool, Econ. Rev. FRBC 27 (1 (1st Q))
(1991) 20–31.
[31] K.I. Woplin, Determinants and consequences of the mortality and health of infants and children, in: M.R. Rosenzweig, O. Stark (Eds.), Handbook of
Population and Family Economics, vol. 1A, Elsevier Science B.V., 1997, pp. 483–557.
